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PARTIES BELOW:
A.

J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION

B.

MICHAEL KAMPROS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah, Section 78-22(j), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended and Rules 3(a) and
4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the trial court error in granting defendant's

Motion for Reconsideration.
2*

Did the trial court error in denying plaintiff's Motion

to Reopen Case for Limited Purpose?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1,

In reviewing the trial court's decision granting

defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, the appellate court will
accord no deference to the trial court's decision and review it
for correctness since it was decided on an issue of law. Scharf
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) (" [W] e accord
conclusions of law no particular deference but review them for
correctness/') ; Handy v. Union Pacific Railroad, 841 P.2d 1210,
1215 (Utah App. 1992) (whether a party has failed to establish a
prima facie case is a question of law); See also Sorenson v.
Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah App.
1994).
2.

In reviewing the trial court's decision denying

1

plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case for Limited Purpose, the
appellate court will grant deference to the trial court's
decision.

College Irrigation Company vs. Logan River &

Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Company, 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989).
ISSUES PRESERVED FOR APPEAL
The foregoing issues were preserved for appeal in
plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration and plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case for Limited
Purpose (R. 261, 263).
STATEMENT OF CASE
J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. ("Hatch Construction") filed a
mechanic's lien against property owned by Michael Kampros
("Kampros") and subsequently filed a Complaint to foreclose on
that mechanic's lien.

Pursuant to Section 38-1-7(3) Utah Code

Annotated, plaintiff also mailed by certified mail a copy of that
mechanic's lien within 30 days of recording to Michael Kampros.
A bench trial was held and plaintiff was the prevailing party.
At trial, plaintiff introduced evidence of the mechanic's lien
but did not introduce evidence of mailing a copy of the
mechanic's lien to defendant.

Defendant never denied receiving

the mailing and never raised the issue at trial or in his
pleadings.

In written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

the trial court awarded plaintiff its attorney's fees as the
successful party pursuant to Section 38-1-18.

2

The Court ruled

that evidence of failure to mail the mechanic's lien within 30
days of recording by certified mail as required by Section 38-17(3) was an affirmative defense that was never plead or alleged
at trial by defendant.
After the Court's ruling, defendant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration urging the Court to reverse its decision that the
mailing requirement was an affirmative defense and hold that
proof of mailing pursuant to Section 38-1-7(3) was part of
plaintiff's prima facie case to recover attorney's fees under
Section 38-1-18.

The effect of such a ruling would be to

eliminate an award of attorney's fees to plaintiff since although
the mailing occurred, plaintiff did not present evidence thereof
at trial.

In addition to opposing that motion, plaintiff filed a

Motion to Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of demonstrating
that the mechanic's lien mailing requirement had been complied
with.

The trial court granted defendant's Motion for

Reconsideration, reversed its prior ruling and held that proof of
mailing was part of plaintiff's prima facie case, which plaintiff
failed to prove at trial and therefore plaintiff was not entitled
to attorney's fees.

The court also denied Plaintiff's Motion to

Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of demonstrating that the
mailing requirement had been complied with.
this appeal from both of those rulings.

>

Plaintiff brought

FACTS
1.

On August 31, 1995, J.v. Hatch Construction, Inc. filed

a valid mechanic's lien on Michael Kampros' property.
2.

(R. 217.)

On August 31, 1995, a copy of the mechanic's lien was

mailed to Michael Kampros by certified mail, as required by
Section 38-1-7(3).
3.

(R. 274-76.)

On September 2, 1995, a Return Receipt for the

certified letter was signed on behalf of Michael Kampros.

(R.

274-76.)
4.

On September 5, 1995, the Return Receipt was post

marked for return mail to plaintiff's attorney.
5.

(R. 274-76.)

In his answer to the Complaint and the Amended

Complaint, defendant did not aver that the mailing did not occur.
(R. 5-10, 56-67.)
6.

The matter was tried before Judge Hilder at a bench

trial on August 12, 1996, September 11, 1996, November 8, 1996
and December 3, 1996. (R. 211.)
7.

At trial, plaintiff did not introduce evidence that a

copy of the mechanic's lien had been timely mailed to defendant,
and the defendant did not introduce evidence that the mailing did
not occur. (R. 217.)
8.

On July 31, 1997, the trial court ruled in plaintiff's

favor on the Amended Complaint and ordered foreclosure of the
mechanic's lien in the amount of $8,500. (R. 216-19.)
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9.

The Court also held that "compliance with the mailing

requirement is not an element of plaintiff's claim.

Any alleged

non-compliance would constitute an affirmative defense, much like
the statute of limitations or statute of frauds."
10.

(R. 217.)

The Court held that plaintiff had "met the essential

requirements of Section 38-1-18, thus creating prima facie proof
of entitlement to attorney's fees." (R. 217-18.)
11.

Section 38-1-18 provides that the "successful party [in

a mechanic's lien] action shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee."
12.

On August 18, 1997, defendant filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, urging the
Court to reverse its previous ruling that plaintiff had proven a
prima facie case of entitlement to attorney's fees under Section
38-1-18.
13.

(R. 240.)
Defendant cited Section 38-1-7(3), which provides that

"failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien" precludes an
award of attorney's fees, and argued that a prima facie case for
the award of attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 includes proof
of mailing pursuant to Section 38-1-7(3).
14.

(R. 242-43.)

Although plaintiff opposed that motion, plaintiff also

filed a Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Case for the Limited Purpose
of proving that the mailing requirement had been complied with.
(R. 268.)

5

15.

A copy of the Return Receipt was attached to

plaintiff's motion, together with an affidavit, affirming that a
timely mailing had, in fact, occurred.
16.

(R. 274-76.)

On October 27, 1997, the trial court granted

defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, holding that proof of
mailing under Section 38-1-7(3) was part of plaintiff's prima
facie case to establish entitlement to attorney's fees under
Section 38-1-18, which had not been proven at trial and therefore
plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees.
17.

(R. 297-99.)

On October 27, 1997, the trial court also denied

plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Case for Limited Purpose
on the grounds that proof of the mailing was in plaintiff's
possession at the time of trial.

(R. 299-300.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in holding that a prima facie case for
attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 includes proof of mailing
under Section 38-1-7(3).

The trial court also erred in denying

plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of
demonstrating that the mailing requirement had been complied
with.
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
The trial court erred in granting defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration on the grounds that A) plaintiff had established
a prima facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, B)

6

the Motion for Reconsideration were filed more than 10 days after
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was entered, and C)
the mailing did occur.
A.

A Prima Facie Case for Attorney's Fees Under Section

38-1-18 Does Not Require Proof of Mailing Under Section 38-17(3) .
In granting defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, the
trial court held that plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie
case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18, inasmuch as
plaintiff had failed to prove that a copy of the mechanic's lien
had been mailed to defendant by certified mail within 30 days of
recording as required by Section 38-1-7(3).

Section 38-1-18

provides that attorney's fees "shall" be awarded to the
"successful party" in mechanic's lien cases:
In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall
be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-18.
Plaintiff was the "successful party" in an action brought under
"this chapter."

Plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien, prevailed at

trial, and the trial court entered a judgment foreclosing on the
mechanic's lien in the amount of $8,500.
A "prima facie case" is the minimum evidence sufficient to
make a claim, until contradicted and overcome by other evidence.

7

See Binkowski v. Township of Shelby, 208 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. App.
1973), see also State vs. Real Property at 633 East 640 North,
Orem, 942 P.2d 925 (Utah 1997).
award

A "prima facie case" for an

of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 38-1-18 requires

only that the plaintiff prove that it was the "successful party"
in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien.

The claim that

plaintiff has failed to comply with Section 38-1-7(3) is an
"avoidance or affirmative defense" that defendant can raise, but
is not part of plaintiff's prima facie case.
Section 38-1-7(3) provides that within 30 days after filing
a mechanic's lien, a copy of the mechanic's lien shall be mailed
to the "reputed owner" or "record owner."

Section 38-1-7(3) also

provides that "failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien" to
the "reputed owner" or "record owner" precludes an award of
attorney's fees:
Within 30 days after filing the notice lien,
the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by
certified mail to either the reputed owner or
record owner of the real property a copy of
the notice of lien. If the record owner's
current address is not readily available, the
copy of the claim may be mailed to the lastknown addresses appearing on the last
completed real property assessment rolls of
the county where the affected property is
located. Failure to deliver or mail the
notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an
award of costs and attorney's fees against
the reputed owner or record owner in an
action to enforce the lien, (Emphasis Added)
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-7(3).

8

In granting defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, the trial
court held that, as a matter of law, a "prima facie" case for
attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 also includes proof of
compliance with the Section 38-1-7(3) mailing requirement.
As set forth below, a claim that Section 38-1-7(3) was not
complied with is an "avoidance or affirmative defense" that may
be raised by defendant, but is not an element of plaintiff's
prima facie claim for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18.
There is no Utah case holding whether compliance with Section 381-7(3) is one of the "elements" that must be proven to recover
attorney's fees pursuant to Section 38-1-18.
As a general rule, statutory defenses that negate a
plaintiff's claim are defenses that may be raised by defendant,
but are not part of plaintiff's prima facie case to establish a
claim.

For example, Section 25-5-4 Utah Code (statute of frauds)

provides that certain "agreements are void unless the
agreement... is in writing, signed by the party to be charged
with the agreement."

However, a prima facie case to recover on

an agreement that falls within the statute of frauds does not
include proving that the "agreement was in writing."
claim must be raised by way of affirmative defense.

Such a
Phillips v.

JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 884 (Utah 1983) (the statute of
frauds is an affirmative defense, not an element of the claim.)
Similarly, Section 78-12-1 Utah Code (statute of

9

limitations) provides that "civil actions may be commenced only
within the periods prescribed in this chapter..."

However, a

prima facie case for a cause of action subject to that chapter
does not including proving that the cause of action was commenced
within the periods prescribed in Title 78, Chapter 12.
claim must be raised by way of affirmative defense.

Such a

Staker v.

Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah
1983) (the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, not
an element of the claim.)
Again, Section 63-30-3 Utah Code (governmental immunity)
provides that "all governmental entities are immune from suit"
with certain exceptions.

However, a prima facie case to recover

against a governmental entity does not require proving that one
of the exceptions apply.

The defendant must raise governmental

immunity as an affirmative defense.

Nelson vs. Salt Lake City,

919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996) ("governmental immunity is an
affirmative defense that must be proved by the defendant.")1
In all of the above examples, a "prima facie case" does not
include proving compliance with the cited statutes.

Similarly,

in this case, if plaintiff is "successful" on a claim filed under

x

Other examples could also be cited. For example, Section
57-14-3 limits landowner liability for recreational accidents.
However, a prima facie case for negligence does not include
proving that the limitations of that chapter do not apply.
Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah
1990) (Section 57-14-1 et seq. is an affirmative defense, not an
element of the claim.)
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the mechanic's lien chapter, it has made a "prima facie case" for
attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18.

Defendant could have, but

did not, raise failure to comply with Section 38-1-7(3) as an
"avoidance or affirmative defense."
The wording of Section 38-1-7(3) further indicates that
noncompliance with the mailing requirement is a defense, not part
of the prima facie case to establish attorney's fees under
Section 38-1-18.

That section provides that "failure to deliver

or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner
precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorney's
fees."

Worded in the negative, the language of the statute

suggests that a defendant seeking to avoid liability for
attorney's fees must raise that "failure" as a defense.

Had the

legislature intended a Section 38-1-7(3) mailing to be part of
the prima facie case for attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18,
Section 38-1-18 or 38-1-7(3) would have stated that claimants
must comply with Section 38-1-7(3) to recover attorney's fees
under Section 38-1-18.

Being worded in the negative, the statute

provides a defense, but is not part of the prima facie case for
attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18.
It is incumbent on the defendant to raise defenses "outside
the scope of a [general denial] of plaintiff's prima facie case"
that would prevent recovery.

General Ins. Co. of America vs.

Carnicero Dynasty Corp, 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976).
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Rule 8 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the manner in which
such an "avoidance or affirmative defense" may be raised.

See

Golding vs. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 899
(Utah 1990) (discussing the procedure for raising an "avoidance
or affirmative defense" under Rule 8). Plaintiff is not required
to rebut such defenses to establish a prima facie case.
In this case, defendant did not claim in his pleadings or at
trial that the mailing did not occur.

Plaintiff's prima facie

case for recovering attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18 did not
include proving compliance with the Section 38-1-7(3) mailing
requirement.

Plaintiff was the "successful party" in a

mechanic's lien case, which satisfied its prima facie case to
recover attorney's fees under Section 38-1-18.

The trial court

errored in reversing its prior ruling and holding that
plaintiff's prima facie case under Section 38-1-18 included proof
of mailing under Section 38-1-7(3).
B.

The Motion For Reconsideration Was Improper.

As a general rule, motions for reconsideration are not
recognized in Utah.

See Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980);

McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978 (Utah 1981).
exceptions to this rule.

There are two

First, where a trial court rules on

less than all of the claims in a case, under Rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the trial court may reconsider
earlier rulings.

See e.g., Timm vs. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah
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1993).

Second, where a motion for reconsideration is in

substance a motion under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the motion to reconsider may be treated as a Rule
59 motion.

See e.g., Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d

1061 (Utah 1991).

This case does not fall under either of those

exceptions.
Consequently, the trial court errored in reconsidering its
earlier ruling.

See Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966)

(a trial court does not have authority to act "as a court of
review upon [its own] ruling.") Therefore, the trial court
errored in considering defendant's motion for reconsideration
where there was no basis to do so under Rule 54(b) or Rule 59 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
C.

The Mailing Did Occur.

The Section 38-1-7(3) mailing requirement was complied with.
The trial court errored in granting defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration without also granting plaintiff's Motion to
Reopen Case for Limited Purpose, to allow plaintiff to
demonstrate proof of mailing.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO REOPEN FOR LIMITED PURPOSE.
Inasmuch as the trial court granted defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration, plaintiff should have been allowed to reopen its
case for the limited purpose of demonstrating that, in fact, the
mailing requirement was complied with.
13

The trial court's

reversal of its prior ruling constituted a surprise to plaintiff.
The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's Motion to Reopen for
Limited Purposes on the grounds that A) plaintiff satisfied the
Rule 59 grounds for reopening a case to take additional
testimony, and B) the mailing did occur.
A.

Plaintiff complied with the requirements of Rule 59 for

reopening the case.
Plaintiff satisfied the grounds set forth in the Rule 59 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to reopen this case for the
limited purpose of demonstrating that the mailing requirement was
complied with.

Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that the Court may "take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions" for a number of reasons, including 1) "[a]ccident or
surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against," and 2) "[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision:"
The court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment
[for any of the following causes]:
•• •

(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against law.
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Both of these grounds were satisfied in this case. At
trial, the trial judge and plaintiff's counsel were of the
opinion that plaintiff had proven a prima facie case for
attorney's fees.

It was not until defendant filed his Motion for

Reconsideration, and the trial court reversed its prior ruling,
that this changed.

This is sufficient "accident or surprise" to

justify plaintiff's introduction of evidence demonstrating
compliance with the mailing requirement.

Where the trial judge

believed at trial that a prima facie case had been proven,
certainly plaintiff was "surprised" when the trial judge later
reversed his decision.

"Ordinary prudence" could not have

guarded against the trial judge later reversing his decision.
Similarly, the trial court had awarded attorney's fees in
its original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The trial

court's later reversal created a "insufficiency of the evidence"
to support its earlier award of attorney's fees.

Since there was

no evidence as to whether the mailing requirement had been
complied with, the case should have been reopened under Rule
59(a)(6) to determine whether there was sufficient evidence (i.e.
proof of mailing) to support the trial court's earlier award of
attorney's fees.
B.

The Mailing Pid QccuCt

The trial court reconsidered its ruling as to whether proof
of mailing was part of plaintiff's prima facie case, but denied a

15

motion to introduce evidence to demonstrate the truth of the
matter.

Mr. Kampros cannot have it both ways.

If the trial

court reconsiders the issue of what constitutes the prima facie
elements of a claim and adds a new element, it is an abuse of
discretion not to reopen the case to determine whether the new
element (the mailing requirement) has been complied with.

In

this case, it is not disputed that the mailing requirement was
complied with.

Defendant knows that the mailing requirement was

complied with.

The trial court knows the mailing requirement was

complied with.
Once the trial court reversed its earlier ruling and added a
new element, it was an abuse of discretion to deny plaintiff's
Motion to Reopen for the Limited Purpose of demonstrating the
truth of the matter—the mailing requirement was complied with.
III.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.

As the prevailing party below, plaintiff should also be
awarded its attorney's fees on appeal.

See R & R Energies vs.

Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1997) (holding
that where a party entitled to attorney's fees below prevails on
appeal, an award of attorney's fees on appeal is proper).
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this court should hold that
proof of mailing under Section 38-1-7(3) is not part of
plaintiff's prima facie case to establish a claim for attorney's
fees under Section 38-1-18.

Alternatively, this court should
16

hold that it was an abuse discretion for the trial court to grant
defendant's Motion for Reconsideration but deny plaintiff's
Motion to Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of demonstrating
that the mailing requirement had been complied with.

This court

should also award plaintiff its attorney's fees on appeal.
DATED this

<~ f day of March, 1998.

lussell A. Cline
Attorney for Appellant

Michael W. Crippen,
Attorney for Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that on this
.day of March, 1998, two
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief
were mailed first class postage prepaid to:
David Overholt
Richer, Swan & Overholt
6925 So. Union Park Center
Suite 450
Midvale, UT 84047
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1.
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MECHANICS' LIENS

38-1-18

38-1-17. Costs — Apportionment — Costs and attorneys'
fee to subcontractor.
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, as between the owner and the
contractor the court shall apportion the costs according to the right of the case,
but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs
awarded to him, including the costs of preparing and recording the notice of
claim of lien and such reasonable attorneys' fee as may be incurred in
preparing and recording said notice of claim of lien.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1394;
C.L. 1917, § 3744; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-117; L. 1961, ch. 76, § 1; 1995, ch. 172, § 3;
1996, ch. 79, § 56.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added "Except as

provided in Section 38-11-107" at the beginning
of the section.
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, substituted "attorneys' fee" for "attorney's
fee."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Interest on judgment.
In action to foreclose mechanic's lien and to
recover for services rendered under contract of

employment, it is not error to allow interest on
sum awarded. Sandberg v. Victor Gold & Silver
Mining Co., 24 Utah 1, 66 P. 360 (1901).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.

Am. JUT. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 461.

38-1-18. Attorneys' fees.
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action brought to enforce any
lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs
in the action.
History: R.S. 1898, § 1400; L. 1899, ch. 58,ment, effective May 1, 1995, added "Except as
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 1400; CJL 1917, § 3750; provided in Section 38-11-107" at the beginning
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-18; L. 1961, ch. 76,of the section.
§ 2; 1995, ch. 172, § 4.
Cross-References. — Attorneys' fee in suit
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- for wages, § 34-27-1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).

ANALYSIS

Appeals.
Denial on excessive claim.
Effect.
Reduction by trial court.
Successful party.
Validity of lien.
Cited.
Appeals.
An appeal from a suit brought to enforce a
lien qualifies as part of "an action" for the
purposes of this section. Richards v. Security
Pac. Natl Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App.),

Denial on excessive claim.
Where it appears on trial that contractor has
substantially performed his contract but that
he attempts to overcharge the owner in setting
the total amount due on a cost-plus-ten-percent contract, the court does not abuse its
discretion in refusing to award the contractor
attorney fees in suit to collect upon such contract. Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417
R2d 246 (1966).
Effect.
This statute is mandatory, not discretionary.
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38-1-7

LIENS

materialman, and no such attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money
due to a subcontractor or materialman from the contractor shall be valid as
against any lien of a laborer employed by the day or piece.
History: R.S. 1898 & CX- 1907, § 1380;
CX. 1917, § 3730; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 521-6.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 265
A.L.R. — Mechanic's hen based on contract
with vendor pending executory contract for sale
of property as affecting purchaser's interest, 50
A.L R.3d 944

Garnishment of funds payable under building and construction contract, 16 A L R 5th
548.

38-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — Service on owner of property.
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with
the county recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the
property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within 90 days
from the date:
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project or improvement for a residence as defined in
Section 38-11-102; or
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence
as defined in Section 38-11-102.
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name
of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he
furnished the equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the
first and last equipment or material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an
acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3,
Recording of Documents. No acknowledgment or certificate is required for
any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989.
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall
deliver or mail by certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of
the real property a copy of the notice of lien. If the record owner's current
address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the
last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county
where the affected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of
lien to the reputed owner or record owner precludes the lien claimant from an
award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record owner
in an action to enforce the lien.
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Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

collected through attachment proceeding,
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805 (1906).
Vacation of satisfaction.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the lien
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of an attorney against the proceeds of the judgment does not include his personal right to execute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V.
Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 1004 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented frorji having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Harmless error not
ground for new trial, Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

Russell A. Cline (4298)
Attorney for Plaintiff
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C.
310 South Main Street Suite #120Q
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,

J.V. HATCH CONSTRUCTION INC,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL KAMPROS,

CIVIL NO. 950010438
JUDGE: ROBERT K. HILDER

Defendant.
This matter having been tried on August 12, 1996, September
11, 1996, November 8, 1996 and December 3, 1996, and this Court
having rendered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
having considered Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Award
of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case,
it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that:
1.

Judgment is granted against Michael Kampros and in favor

of J.V. Hatch Construction in the amount of $8,500, said amount to
bear interest at 10% per annum from August 31, 1995 to the date
hereof and thereafter at the applicable post judgment rate.
2.

J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. is awarded judgment against

Michael Kampros in the amount of $445.00 in costs said amount to
bear judgment at the applicable post interest rate.
3.

Defendant's

Motion

for Reconsideration

of

Award

of

Attorney's Fees and Costs is granted.
4.

Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case is denied.

5.

It is hereby ordered that plaintiff's Mechanic's Lien

filed on the property described on Exhibit A hereto shall be
foreclosed and said property sold at sheriff's sale by the sheriff
of Salt Lake County pursuant to Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to satisfy the foregoing debt.
DATED this / /

day of November,

Approved as to Form:

Randy Ludlow
2

Exhibit A
BEG N 00-02*55" W 94.63 ft & S 89-53'55" W 1315.20 FT & S
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M; N 89-53*55" E 142 FT; S 00-06*05" E 320 FT; S 89-53* 55"
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5116-1275 5123-0998 6251-16, Salt Lake County, Utah.
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